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1 Introduction
The theoretical literature on R&D has dealt extensively with the issues
of investment in cost-reducing R&D in the presence of spillovers. In fact,
since the seminal paper by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), a number
of authors have extended this original model in a number of ways. However,
the presence of public (or state) rms and the role of public policy in this
context, in the form of R&D subsidies and privatizations has not yet been
addressed. In contrast, there is strong empirical evidence on innovative
industries of the importance of the public sector, dened broadly as state-
owned laboratories, public universities, technological institutes and public
enterprises (see Katz 2001; Poyago-Theotoky 1998).
An example of a public rmsimportance in terms of R&D investment,
can be observed in the health-care sector, where private and public rms
normally coexist. Nowadays, the health care sector is facing major chal-
lenges that call for improved quality and increased e¢ ciency in resource
utilization (Aanestad et al. 2003).1 By means of R&D activities, hospitals
attempt to improve their organizational arrangements and to enhance exist-
ing processes and work practises. Another example comes from agriculture,
where the public sector has been the primary source of research in biotech-
nology (Oehmke 2001). With regard to public subsidies towards R&D, it is
important to note that the emergence and development of many discoveries
has been facilitated by public funding of R&D, e.g., biotechnology (Hart
1998). This highlights the importance of the role that technology policy in
the form of R&D subsidization can play in high-tech industries.
On the other hand, there is a continuing public debate on the e¤ects
and advisability of privatization, which has consequently generated a great
interest among economists in mixed markets and in the potential welfare
e¤ects of privatization.2 However, the R&D aspect of the rmsactivity has
been largely ignored by the literature. Although there are a few exceptions,
such as Delbono and Denicoló (1993), Poyago-Theotoky (1998) and Nett
(1994),3 none of these contributions has considered the use of R&D subsidies
1Aanestad et. al. (2003) provide empirical evidence from the Interventional Centre
established as a medical R&D department in a Norwegian public hospital (Rikshospitalet)
in order to explore and develop new technologies and procedures.
2See e.g., De Fraja and Delbono (1989), (1990), Fjell and Pal (1996), Matsumura
(1998), Pal and White (1998) and Willner (1999).
3Assuming perfect patent protection that yields R&D overinvestment in the private
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by the policy-maker or the existence of spillovers in the context of e¢ ciency-
enhancing innovation.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to study e¢ ciency-
enhancing (cost-reducing) R&D in the context of a mixed duopoly with
spillovers and R&D subsidies. We aim at shedding some light on the e¤ect
of R&D subsidies and spillovers on the R&D e¤ort patterns of public and
private rms and the comparative performance of these two types of rms in
cost-reducing innovation. Evidence on the latter issue goes back to the sem-
inal works by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) that identied a gap between
private and social returns to R&D. According to this observation, public
rms are more likely to address social (welfare maximization) than pure
rm-specic(prot maximization) objectives and in turn to spend more in
R&D.4 We also study the e¤ects of privatization on R&D in order to provide
a plausible explanation for the observed post-privatization scaling down of
R&D activity (see Munari and Sobrero 2000, Munari and Oriani 2001 and
Katz 2001, among others) and provide some tentative policy guidelines.
A key feature in this study is the failure of R&D market to produce
socially optimal levels. An understanding of the relevant forces at work in
determining the market outcome provides a useful framework within which
our model can be analysed. These forces may be explained as follows.
Consider initially the case of no spillover , i.e., R&D is perfectly appro-
priable. In the course of conducting R&D prior to choosing output, rms
will tend to over-invest as a means of enhancing their own competitive po-
sition. According to this perspective, there is a strategic over-investment
e¤ect. However, when a positive spillover occurs, and as  rises, this tends
to discourage cost-reducing R&D in the usual duopolistic setting.5 In our
mixed duopoly model, however, a higher spillover rate induces an increase
in the total level of R&D in fact, this carries over in the post-privatization
duopoly, Delbono and Denicoló (1993) suggested the presence of a public rm as a means
for alleviating this problem. According to PoyagoTheotoky (1998), by relaxing the main
assumption of Delbono and Denicoló, almost all their results can be reversed. Nett (1994)
established as to why public rms opt for producing at a higher cost than the private rm.
Further, Nett showed that welfare in the private duopoly may exceed welfare in the mixed
duopoly.
4Empirical evidence also pinpoints to the role of state-owned enterprises in the devel-
opment and evolution of national innovation systems by means of their R&D investments
(see e.g., Nelson 1993 and Katz 2001).
5See, for example, DAsprémont and Jacquemin (1988) among others.
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regime.6
A private rm, in addition, does not take into account consumer surplus
in its objective function. This implies another type of market failure, the
so-called under-valuation e¤ect (see Katsoulacos and Ulph 1998). Contrary
to this, the public rms objective is consistent with welfare maximization
which in turn promotes an increase in the equilibrium level of R&D. This
means that the public rm may serve as an instrument for alleviating under-
investment. However, there is a second and opposing force. Namely, the
public rm will introduce another type of market failure  ine¢ ciency in
production related to the composition of R&D, i.e., there is an asymmetry
in the distribution of post-R&D costs.7
In what follows, we postulate that the failure of the R&D market to
produce socially optimal levels is addressed by a (positive) subsidy to R&D
output. Since the regulator faces two failures both in the R&D and output
markets with one policy tool at her disposal this approach would naturally
translate into a second-best optimal solution.
Our model considers a homogeneous good Cournot duopoly in which
rms undertake cost-reducing (process) innovation. This draws on and ex-
tends the specication introduced by dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988),
including subsidies towards R&D. Our results show that the optimal R&D
subsidy is always positive and increasing in the degree of spillovers. More-
over, we nd that private industries should be subsidized less than mixed
ones. Our ndings also suggest that even though the R&D of the public rm
may decrease as a result of privatization, the R&D of the private rm may
increase or decrease, depending on the rate of spillovers and consequently,
on the extent of the appropriability problem. Finally, regarding the e¤ects
of privatization on social welfare, our analysis reveals that privatization is
detrimental to social welfare. Thus, from a welfare point of view, a mixed
duopoly is always better, which lends some support to the popular views
against the widespread application of privatization programmes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
6Even though, this case does not bring about a market failure itself, it turns out that
the overall impact on total R&D output is negative, implying a sub-obtimal level of cost-
reducing innovation.
7Notice that the fundamental failures arising in the R&D market coexist with the ones
in the output market: imperfect competition and ine¢ cient distribution of post-innovation
costs.
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the model. Sections 3 and 4 study the cases of the mixed and private
duopolies, respectively. A comparison of both cases and the implications for
policy-making are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a market setting consisting of two rms competing in output.
We compare two market structures: a mixed duopoly (one of the two rms
is public) and a private duopoly. Private rms are assumed to be prot-
maximizing while the public rm is assumed to maximize social welfare. In
the case of the mixed duopoly, we denote with subscript 0 the public rm
and with subscript 1 the private rm. The inverse demand function for the
homogeneous good produced by the rms is
P (Q) = a Q, 0  Q < a (1)
where Q = qi + qj ; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g.
Firms engage in cost-reducing (process) innovation in order to lower
their marginal cost, following research paths that are perfect substitutes,
i.e. we consider a non-tournament R&D setting.8 The e¤ective level of
R&D, Xi, represents the reduction in marginal cost due to R&D, and has
two components: the own level of R&D output, xi; and the competitors
R&D output, xj ; via spillovers
Xi = xi + xj ; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g (2)
where the extent of information leakage or degree of spillovers among rms
is captured by the parameter , which is assumed to be exogenously given
and 0    1: Thus, rm is total cost function depends on its level
of production, qi; and the e¤ective level of R&D, Xi. To avoid a natural
monopoly, which is not relevant for the purposes of our paper,9 we assume
the existence of diminishing returns to scale by introducing a quadratic term
related to production in a rms cost function. Hence, production cost is
8This means that the research rms undertake research leads to the same discovery
(see eg. Katsoulacos and Ulph, 1998).
9We are interested in the strategic interaction in R&D between rms.
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represented as
Ci(qi; Xi) = (c Xi)qi + q2i , i 2 f0; 1g, a > c > 0 (3)
which yields marginal cost of production mci = @Ci@qi = (c Xi)+2qi: Notice
that the e¤ective level of R&D, Xi; a¤ects only the intercept of the marginal
cost (i.e. it shifts the marginal cost curve downwards) but not its slope. This
is the same e¤ect that process R&D has on production costs in DAspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) and followers, where production costs are assumed to
be linear. 10
We assume that R&D is subject to diminishing returns at an increasing
rate so that rm is R&D cost function can be written as
 i (xi) = x
2
i , i 2 f0; 1g: (4)
Hence, by investing x2i in R&D, a rm can lower its costs by xi due to its own
research e¤ort and by an additional amount xj via unpaid appropriation
of some part of the rival rms e¤ort. The government subsidizes the R&D
output of each rm. Each rm receives a subsidy
Si = sxi (5)
where s is the subsidy per-unit of R&D output. Using expressions (1), (3),
(2), (4) and (5), we obtain rm is prot function
i = P (Q)qi   Ci(qi; Xi)   i(xi) + Si, i 2 f0; 1g: (6)
Social welfare is given by the aggregation of consumer surplus (CS) and
producers surplus (PS) net of subsidies
SW =
1
2
Q2|{z}
CS
+ i + j| {z }
PS
  s(xi + xj)| {z }
Subsidy
: (7)
Note that the subsidy has no direct e¤ect on social welfare and hence on
the objective function of the public rm, as it cancels out when aggregating
10This formulation allows us to introduce diminishing returns in production and main-
tain the spirit of previous contributions in a simple way and without loss of generality.
6
SW =
1
2
Q2 +
1X
i=0
[P (Q)qi   Ci(qi; Xi)   i(xi)]:
However, the subsidy a¤ects social welfare indirectly via rms R&D
choices and as a consequence, via R&D costs and reductions of marginal
production costs. Also a further indirect (and strategic) e¤ect takes place:
even though there is no direct e¤ect of the subsidy on the objective function
of the public rm, the public rms R&D (and output) will be a¤ected by
the subsidy through its impact on the private rms R&D choice.
In order to study the e¤ects of R&D subsidies on R&D and the e¤ects of
privatization on innovation, welfare and on the optimal subsidy, we consider
a simple three-stage game with observable actions. Its time structure unfolds
as follows:
Stage 1. The government chooses the level of a subsidy to R&D in order
to maximize social welfare;
Stage 2. Firms make their R&D decisions;
Stage 3. Firms play a standard Cournot game.
As usual, we proceed to solve this game by means of backwards induction
to nd the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
3 Mixed duopoly
In this section we study the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE
henceforth) for a mixed duopoly in which the optimal R&D subsidy is pro-
vided by the government. In the last stage of the game, each rm chooses
quantity to maximize its objective function, taking the quantity of the other
rm as given. Solving the system of rst-order conditions (FOC henceforth)
of the relevant maximization problems, yields the following Cournot-Nash
equilibrium quantities
qm0 (x0; x1) =
3(a  c) + (4  )x0 + (4   1)x1
11
; (8)
qm1 (x0; x1) =
2(a  c) + (3   1)x0 + (3  )x1
11
: (9)
Note that 4    4   1 (and 3    3   1), implying that a rms own
R&D contributes more to its output than to its rivals output (except for
7
 = 1). After substituting the equilibrium quantities into social welfare and
into the private rms prot function, we proceed to solve the R&D stage.
3.1 R&D output stage
In the second stage, the public rm chooses its R&D output (cost reduction)
to maximize welfare whereas the private rm decides on its R&D to max-
imize prot. Given qm0 and q
m
1 ; the FOCs give rise to the following R&D
best-response functions11
r0(x1) =
(31 + 28)(a  c)  [14  (87  14)]x1
197 + 14(2  3) ; (10)
r1(x0) =
8(3  )(a  c)  4(3  )(1  3)x0 + 121s
206 + 4(6  ) : (11)
It is interesting to note that the slope of r0(x1) and r1(x0) is negative for
lower values of  and positive for higher values of , meaning that R&D is a
strategic substitute/complement depending on the extent of informational
spillovers. The following lemma elaborates.
Lemma 1 In the mixed duopoly, R&D is
(i) a strategic substitute for both rms for  < 0:17 ,
(ii) a strategic substitute for the private rm but a strategic complement for
the public rm for 0:17 <  < 0:33 and
(iii) a strategic complement for both rms if  > 0:33:
Proof. By di¤erentiating (10) we obtain @r0(x1)=@x1  ()0 if and only
if   ()0:17: Next, di¤erentiating (11) yields @r1(x0)=@x0  ()0 if and
only if   ()0:33: Combining these two observations the result follows.
Lemma 1 reveals that R&D is initially a strategic substitute and becomes
a strategic complement, as spillovers intensify. The intuition underlying this
result is determined on the basis of the interaction between two opposing
e¤ects. When rm i increases its investment on R&D, this worsens the
competitive position of rm j (business stealing e¤ect). Furthermore, given
11The second order condition for the public rm requires 197+28 422 > 0; the stabil-
ity condition is
 14  87 + 142 =  197 + 28   422 < 1. The respective conditions
for the private rm are: 103+12 22 > 0 and  (6  20 + 62 =  103 + 12   22 <
1. All conditions are indeed satised.
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the public good nature of the cost reduction, rm j is capable of improving
its own cost e¢ ciency via technological spillovers (spillover e¤ect). Not
surprisingly, if spillovers are relatively low the former e¤ect will dominate
the later, implying that rm j will e¤ectively loose out to its rival, i.e. R&D
is a strategic substitute. By contrast, a relatively high spillover rate would
mean that an R&D investment on part of rm i is benecial for j, i.e., R&D
is a strategic complement.12 Furthermore, it is clear that the threshold value
of spillovers that determines the turning point from strategic substitution
to strategic complementarity is lower in the case of the public rm than in
the case of the private rm. This result is similar to the ones obtained in
Delbono and Denicoló (1993) and PoyagoTheotoky (1998), in the context
of R&D patent races.
Solving the system of (10) and (11) we obtain the R&D equilibrium
outcomes as a function of the subsidy s
xm0 (s) =
2[25 + 2(18  )](a  c)  s[14  (87  14)]
2[167 + 2(25  )(1  )] ; (12)
xm1 (s) =
4(9  2)(a  c) + s[197 + 14(2  3)]
2[167 + 2(25  )(1  )] : (13)
Subsequently, the equilibrium quantities can be rewritten as
qm0 (s) =
2[53 + (31  18)](a  c) + s[ 23 + (102 +    142)]
2[167 + 2(25  )(1  )] ; (14)
qm1 (s) =
11 [2(3 + )(a  c) + s(5  (2  ))]
2[167 + 2(25  )(1  )] : (15)
Next, we proceed to examine the e¤ect that the R&D subsidy has on in-
novation (cost reduction) and output levels by means of comparative statics.
The following Lemmata summarize.
Lemma 2 (i) The public rms R&D output is decreasing (increasing) in
the subsidy rate if  < 0 :17 ( > 0 :17 ). (ii) The private rms R&D output
is increasing in the subsidy rate for all  2 [0 ; 1 ]. (iii) The total R&D
output, xm0 +x
m
1 , is increasing in the subsidy rate, s.
Proof. Di¤erentiating xm0 (s) we obtain
@xm0
@s =
 14+(87 14)
2H ; where
12Amir et. al. (2000) discuss a similar result for a private duopoly case.
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H = 167 + 2(25   )(1   ) > 0 8 ,  2 [0; 1]. Given that the de-
nominator is positive, it follows that @x
m
0
@s  ()0 if and only if   (
)0:17. Di¤erentiation of xm1 (s) yields
@xm1
@s =
197+14(2 3)
2H > 0 8. Finally,
@(xm0 +x
m
1 )
@s =
183+115 562
2H > 0 8.
The above result is driven by the subsidy-induced movements of the
R&D best-response functions. In particular, if the spillover is relatively low
( < 0:17), an increase in the amount of subsidy increases the R&D spend-
ing and hence R&D output for the private rm (direct e¤ect of the subsidy).
Its best-response function shifts out, and as both best-response functions
are downward sloping, this leads to a decrease in the R&D for the public
rm (indirect e¤ect of the subsidy). When the spillover lies within the inter-
mediate range (0:17 <  < 0:33), the private rms best-response function
shifts outwards too, in response to an increase in the subsidy. This has now
a positive rather than a negative impact on the public rms R&D output,
due to strategic complementarity (from the public rms point of view). Fi-
nally, if the spillover is relatively high ( > 0:33), implying that R&D is a
strategic complement, an increase in the subsidy will always increase total
R&D output. Finally, it is interesting to note that when an increase in the
subsidy decreases the public rms R&D output ( < 0:17), this decrease
will be outweighed by the increase in the private rms R&D, yielding an
increase in the total level of R&D (Part (iii) of Lemma 2).
Lemma 3 (i) The output of the public rm is decreasing (increasing) in the
subsidy rate if  < 0 :23 ( > 0 :23 ). (ii) The output of the private rm is
increasing in the subsidy rate for all  2 [0 ; 1 ]. (iii) Total output, qm0 +qm1 ,
is increasing in the subsidy rate, s.
Proof. Part (i): @q
m
0
@s =
 23+(102+ 142)
2H > 0 if and only if  > 0:23
as H = 167 + 2(25   )(1   ) > 0 8 ,  2 [0; 1]. For part (ii): @qm1@s =
11[5 (2 )]
2H > 0 8. Finally,
@(qm0 +q
m
1 )
@s =
16+(40+6 72)
2H > 0 8.
The above lemma states that a threshold value for the spillover exists
such that the net impact of the subsidy on the public rms output can be
positive or negative. Two e¤ects are interacting and determining this result:
(a) The subsidy will a¤ect the public rmsoutput via the e¤ect it exerts
on cost-reducing R&D. From lemma 2, the public rms R&D is decreasing
(increasing) in s for  < 0:17. (b) The subsidy will impact the public
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rmsoutput via the output of the private rm. In fact, from lemma 2, we
know that the subsidy e¤ect on the private R&D e¤ort is always positive.
An increase in the private R&D will a¤ect not only the private rms own
output but also, indirectly, the public rms output, with the latter e¤ect
being negative.13 The e¤ect described in (b) will always be negative and will
only be compensated by the e¤ect described in (a) for  > 0:23. With regard
to the private rm, the result is clearcut: a higher subsidy will always lead
to higher output. The reason is that the positive e¤ect of private R&D on
the private rms output dominates the negative e¤ect of the public rms
output on the private output level. As well, total output is everywhere
increasing in s, which highlights the positive association between R&D and
output decisions (See the previous Lemma).
3.2 R&D subsidy stage
In this section, we derive the optimal R&D subsidy for the mixed market.
The government will choose the value of the subsidy that maximizes wel-
fare. Substituting the equilibrium R&D output levels and quantities into
the social welfare objective function and solving the FOC with respect to s,
we obtain the equilibrium subsidy14
sm =
2[3 + (32 + 17   92)](a  c)
162 + [56  (101  72)] : (16)
The next Proposition establishes the characteristics of the optimal R&D
subsidy.
Proposition 1 In the mixed duopoly, the optimal R&D subsidy is always
positive and increasing in the rate of spillovers.
Proof. From (16), ds
m
d =
K(a c)
B2
, where (a   c) > 0, K = 2(5016 +
6114   1902   10923 + 2374   2385 + 636) > 0; B = 162 + [56  
(101   72)] > 0 8 ,  2 [0; 1]. It follows that dsmd > 0: Next, note that
sm j=0= 6(a c)162 > 0 and hence by continuity sm > 0 8:
13Quantities are strategic substitutes.
14The second order condition, which is available from the authors upon request, is
satised. The equilibrium solutions for R&D output, output quantitiy, prots, Consumers
Surplus and Social Welfare can be found in Table 1 in the appendix.
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Although this result may perhaps seem surprising, its intuition is clear
once one observes the role of the subsidy in tackling important market fail-
ures. As pointed out in the Introduction, these failures are associated with
the composition of R&D15 as well as with total level of R&D and output
production. In the present context, however, there is a second and opposing
factor, which tends to encourage R&D spending. That is, contrary to the
conventional wisdom that spillovers induce a decline in total R&D output,
it turns out they indeed promote an increase in R&D spending.16 Yet, as
total R&D output and output quantity remains sub-optimal,17 this in turn
calls for a positive subsidy to R&D output.
Further, notice that total R&D output (xm0 + x
m
1 ) is increasing in s
(Lemma 2). Moreover, as  increases the social returns to the R&D subsidy
increase, since the results of the R&D will spread across rms more e¤ec-
tively. That, in turn, may explain why the subsidy rate will be adjusted
upwards following an increase in the rate of spillover. The intuition is in
the line with the observation reported by Hinloopen (1997) for a private
duopoly with linear cost functions.18
15The e¢ ciency comparison based on the rmstotal cost is not straightforward: While
the private rm produces a greater output quantity than the private rm, thereby op-
erating at a higher marginal cost (at xmi = 0), it also makes a larger investment
in cost-reduction, so that the balance can go either direction. It turns out that
(c   xm0   xm1 )qm0 + (qm0 )2 + (xm0 )2 > (c   xm1   xm0 )qm1 + (qm1 )2 + (xm1 )2, implying
that the private rm is more e¢ cient than its (public) rival. This result is consistent
with the standard argument in the literature that privatization leads to e¢ ciency gains
in the state-owned rm. Furthermore, a positive subsidy to R&D output can address this
asymmetry in the equilibrium distribution of production costs. Therefore cost-e¢ ciency
can be partially restored by reducing the di¤erence in R&D (and hence output) results of
the rivals. This is precisely the cost redistribution e¤ect of the subsidy that improves the
level of productive e¢ ciency.
16Note that @(xm0 + x
m
1 )=@ > 0 8.
17 In can be shown that the R&D investment of the public rm is higher than the
socially optimal investment (dened by a public duopoly due to diminishing returns in
production), if  < 0:29. This behavior indicates that the existence of spillovers and
the associated appropriabilty problem play an important role in determining innovation
incentives. Moreover, the private rm always conducts a lower level of R&D compared to
the rst-best and total R&D output is sub-optimal too.
18Also Petrakis and PoyagoTheotoky (2002) showed that the (two) properties of the
optimal subsidy carry over under a private duopoly and no environmental damages (i.e.,
no pollution).
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4 Private duopoly
In the nal stage of the game, both rms choose their output levels to
maximize prots. Solving the system of the associated FOCs, we obtain the
stage-three equilibrium outputs:
qpi =
3(a  c) + (4  )xi + (4   1)xj
15
; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g: (17)
Substituting these into the prot function of both rms and solving the
system of FOCs, we obtain the following R&D best-response functions19
rpi (xj) =
12(4  )(a  c)  4(4  )(1  4)xj + 225s
2[193 + 2(8  )] ; i 6= j; i; j 2 f0; 1g
(18)
Similarly to dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), when the degree of spillovers
is either low or high enough, the R&D decisions are either strategic substi-
tutes ( < ) or complements ( > ). By straightforward calculation we
obtain that this threshold value is  = 0:25.
Solving the system of the R&D best-response functions, we nd the
equilibrium R&D levels
xpi (s) =
4(4  )(a  c) + 75s
2[67  2(3  )] , i 2 f0; 1g: (19)
Similarly to the e¤ect of the subsidy on private R&D in the mixed
duopoly, note that the level of R&D is also positively related to the sub-
sidy rate in the private duopoly. The equilibrium output as function of the
subsidy can be written as
qpi (s) =
15 [2(a  c) + s(1 + )]
2[67  2(3  )] , i 2 f0; 1g: (20)
In this case too, the quantities produced depend positively on the amount
of subsidy with this e¤ect being the outcome of the positive R&D-output
association. Substituting the equilibrium R&D levels and equilibrium quan-
tities into the formula for social welfare and performing the maximization
19The second order condition is 386 + 32   42 > 0 and the stability condition4  4  17 + 42 =  386 + 32   42 < 1. Clearly, both conditions are satised.
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with respect to s we obtain20
sp =
2(1 + 11)(a  c)
3[22  3(2 + )] : (21)
The result is the equilibrium optimal R&D subsidy in the private duopoly.
Analogously to sm, it is easy to see that sp is also be positive and increasing
in :
5 Comparing the two market structures
In this section we compare the optimal subsidy rate, R&D output and quan-
tity produced across the two market structure congurations and provide
some tentative policy guidelines with respect to privatizing the public rm.
We do this in a series of propositions.
Proposition 2 The optimal R&D subsidy in the mixed duopoly is higher
than in the private duopoly, sm> sp.
Proof. From (16) and (21) it follows that
sm   sp = 2(36+220+42 773+24+45)(a c)3EB > 0 8 2 [0; 1], since E =
22  3(2 + ) > 0 and B = 162 + [56  (101  72)] > 0, 8;  2 [0; 1].
The above proposition shows that the government should provide a larger
subsidy to the mixed market than the fully private market, ceteris paribus.
In contrast, one would expect the subsidy to R&D output in the private
market to exceed the subsidy in the mixed market, since, as it will be elab-
orated, a comparison of social welfare levels reveal SWm > SW p. However,
the intuition underlying our initially surprising nding is clear once one ob-
serves that the social returns to the subsidy are higher in the mixed duopoly.
As expected, a mixed duopoly will produce a greater R&D output, thereby
inducing higher social returns to R&D investment.
According to a second interpretation, there is an inter-play between two
e¤ects. The rst is the under-valuation e¤ect, thus pushing towards (so-
cially) sub-optimal innovation. In fact, for the private duopoly, the same
20The second order condition is satised. The equilibrium solutions for R&D output,
output quantitiy, prots, ConsumersSurplus and Social Welfare can be found in Table 2
in the appendix.
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e¤ect is two sided and hence it reduces total R&D more than it does for
the mixed duopoly. The second e¤ect is the cost asymmetry arising in the
mixed market as discussed earlier. This e¤ect vanishes in the move from the
mixed to the private duopoly optimum, since both rms conduct the same
amount of R&D and hence produce at equal cost. It turns out that the
combined force of cost asymmetry and under-valuation e¤ect by the private
rm in a mixed duopoly dominate the two sided under-valuation e¤ect in a
private duopoly, thus causing the subsidy rate to fall with privatization.
Our main ndings regarding the comparison between R&D levels, out-
puts and prot across market congurations are summarized below (Proof
is in the Appendix).
Proposition 3 (i) Total R&D output and total quantity produced are al-
ways higher in the mixed duopoly than in the private duopoly; xm0 +x
m
1 > 2x
p
i
and qm0 +q
m
1 > 2q
p
i . (ii) Total prot in the private duopoly exceeds total prot
in the mixed duopoly if  < 0 :94 ; m0 +
m
1 < 2
p
i .
This proposition gives an insight into the welfare e¤ects of privatization.
The following remarks may be useful in understanding the result. When
socially optimal subsidies to R&D are provided by the government both in
the mixed and the private duopolies, the following hold: (a) the public rm
in a mixed duopoly generates more cost reduction (invests more in R&D)
than a rm in the private duopoly, xm0   xp0 > 0, (b) the private rm does
more R&D in the private duopoly than in the mixed duopoly, xm1   xp1 > 0,
if  < 0:44, (c) the public rm produces more in a mixed duopoly than a
rm in a private duopoly, qm0   qp0 > 0, (d) a private rm produces more in
a private duopoly than in a mixed duopoly, qm1   qp1 < 0, (e) the prots of a
rm in a private duopoly are higher than those of a public rm in a mixed
duopoly, m0   p0 < 0, if  < 0:65 and (f) the prots of a private rm are
higher in a private duopoly than in a mixed duopoly, m1   p1 < 0.
Regarding social welfare, the following result obtains.
Proposition 4 Under a government policy of providing optimal subsidies
to R&D, social welfare is always higher in the mixed duopoly than in the
private duopoly.
Proof. From the equilibrium solutions for social welfare (see Appendix),
SWm SW p = (18+10 52)(a c)2EB > 0 8;  2 [0; 1] as E = 22 3(2+) >
15
0, B = 162 + [56  (101  72)] > 0 and 18 + 10   52 > 0;8.
The explanation behind Proposition 4 is in line with the remarks made
above. Namely, privatization of the public rm reduces the aggregate output
level and thus lowers consumer surplus. However, it leads to higher prots
not only for the private rm but also for the privatized public rm as long
as spillovers obtain from intermediate to low values. It turns out that the
former negative e¤ect dominates the latter positive one, inducing a decline in
social welfare with privatization. As already noted by De Fraja and Delbono
(1989)21 privatization increases welfare only if the number of competitors is
su¢ ciently large. In this case, the gains in terms of productive e¢ ciency
will outweigh the losses in terms of allocative e¢ ciency.
Another line of reasoning highlights the role of market failures in explain-
ing the result.22 The public rm invests more in R&D than a private rm
under both market set-ups, but at the expense of bringing about ine¢ ciency
in the equilibrium distribution of production costs (See also Propositions 1
and 2). It turns out that the former e¤ect will dominate the latter and
as a result, welfare in the mixed market will exceed welfare in the private
market.23
In sum, combining propositions 1, 2 and 4 yields some interesting in-
sights into a class of policy relevant questions. First, the optimal prescrip-
tion should be adjusted according to the degree of spillovers. Second, we
found that a lower subsidy to R&D in the private market should be provided
compared to the mixed one. Finally, given that the mixed market attains
higher levels of welfare, privatization is not recommended. This argument
o¤ers some support to the view against the widespread adoption of priva-
tization programmes. It should be stressed that these policy implications
have been derived within a rather limited context and care should be taken
with generalizing them to markets with many rms both private and pub-
lic. However, even within this limited context, it is clear that conventional
presumptions about the desirability and e¢ ciency of privatization can be
21 In their seminal paper, De Fraja and Delbono (1989) do not consider the rmsdeci-
sions on R&D investment.
22Recall that the social planner can attain a second best optimum with only one policy
toola subsidy to R&D outputat her disposal. The reason is that in addition to the
market failures related to R&D, there are market failures at work in the output market
side.
23Precisely, in the move from the mixed to the private duopoly optimum, the under-
valuation e¤ect worsens under-investment, as well.
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overturned when specic features, like R&D and appropriability issues, are
added into the frame of analysis.
6 Conclusion
Although the literature on R&D has studied extensively the issue of R&D
investment in the presence of spillovers, very little attention has been paid
to the presence of public rms and the role of public policy in this context.
However, there is strong empirical evidence showing the importance of the
public sector in highly innovative industries. This paper extends the relevant
literature by introducing a public rm in the context of a duopoly with
spillovers and cost-reducing R&D in order to study the role of subsidies
towards R&D and the impact of privatization of the public rm on R&D
and welfare.
Our analysis suggests that the socially optimal R&D subsidy should
be positive and increasing in the degree of spillovers. When the public
rm is privatized and thus maximizes prot instead of welfare, our novel
argument is that each rm in the market should be subsidized at a lower
rate. As indicated, this links free-riding behaviour on part of the rms to
the existence of important failures of the R&D market to produce socially
optimal levels.
Regarding the long-run e¤ects of privatization, our analysis has revealed
that even though the R&D investments of the public rm will decrease after
privatization, the R&D of the private rm may increase or decrease depend-
ing on the spillover rate. Further, we have established that privatization
increases the output of the private rm and decreases the output of the
public rm. The output level of the industry will become lower, reducing
consumer surplus. Considering the rmsoverall protability, the conclusion
is that it will be unambiguously higher. However, the increase of producers
surplus will not compensate the reduction in consumers welfare. All in all,
privatization would reduce social welfare in this context and hence would
not be recommended. In future research we aim at exploring the robustness
of our results by relaxing some of the assumptions in our model.
17
References
[1] Aanestad, M., Mork, E. B., Grisot, M., Hanseth, O., Syvertsen, M.
C. (2003) Knowledge as a Barrier to Learning: A Case Study from
Medical R&D, paper presented at the 4th European Conference on
Organisational Knowledge, Learning and Capabilities, April.
[2] Amir, M., Amir, R., and Jin, J. (2000) Sequencing R&D decisions in
a two-period duopoly with spillovers, Economic Theory, 15, 297-317.
[3] Arrow, K. (1962) Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in R. Nelson (Ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive
Activity, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
[4] dAspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A. (1988) Cooperative and Noncoop-
erative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers, American Economic Review,
78, 1133- 37.
[5] De Fraja, G. and Delbono, F. (1989) Alternative Strategies of a Public
Firm in Oligopoly, Oxford Economic Papers, 41, 302-11.
[6] De Fraja, G. and Delbono, F. (1990) Game-theoretic Models of Mixed
Oligopoly, Journal of Economic Surveys, 4, 1-17.
[7] Delbono, F. and Denicoló, V. (1993) Regulating Innovative Activity:
The Role of a Public Firm, International Journal of Industrial Orga-
nization, 11 (1), 35-48.
[8] Fjell, K. and Pal, D. (1996) A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of
Foreign Private Firms, Canadian Journal of Economics, 29 (3), 737-
43.
[9] Hart, M. D. (1998) US Technology Policy: New Tools for New Times,
<http://www.nira.go.jp/publ/review/98summer/hart.html>, Summer
1998.
[10] Hinloopen, J. (1997) Subsidising Cooperative and Noncooperative
R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers, Journal of Economics, 66 (2), 151-75.
[11] Katsoulacos, Y. and Ulph, D. (1998) Innovation Spillovers and Tech-
nology Policy, Annales dEconomie et de Statistique, 49/50, 589-607.
18
[12] Katz, J. (2001) Structural Reforms and Technological Behavior. The
Sources and Nature of Technological Change in Latin America in the
1990s, Research Policy, 30, 1-19.
[13] Matsumura, T. (1998) Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly, Jour-
nal of Public Economics, 70, 473-83.
[14] Munari, F. and Oriani, R. (2001) The Impact of Privatization on the
Economic Returns to R&D Activities. Empirical Evidence from a Sam-
ple of European Firms, paper presented at Eindhoven Centre for In-
novation Studies Conference, The Netherlands, September.
[15] Munari, F. and Sobrero, M. (2000) From Stakeholders Value to Share-
holders Value: The E¤ects of Privatization Processes on R&D Invest-
ments, paper presented at the 20th Strategic Management Society Con-
ference, Vancouver, October.
[16] Nelson, R. R. (1959) The Simple Economics of Basic Scientic Re-
search, Journal of Political Economy, 67, 297-306.
[17] Nett, L. (1994) Why Private Firms are more Innovative than Public
Firms, European Journal of Political Economy, 10, 639-53.
[18] Oehmke, F. J. (2001) Biotechnology R&D Races, Industry Structure,
and Public and Private Sector Research Orientation, AgBioForum, 4
(2), 105-14.
[19] Pal, D. and White, M. D.(1998) Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization and
Strategic Trade Policy, Southern Economic Journal, 65, 264-81.
[20] Petrakis, E. and Poyago-Theotoky, J. (2002) R&D Subsidies versus
R&D Cooperation in a Duopoly with Spillovers and Pollution, Aus-
tralian Economic Papers, 41 (1), 37-52.
[21] Poyago-Theotoky J. (1998) R&D Competition in a Mixed Duopoly
under Uncertainty and Easy Imitation, Journal of Comparative Eco-
nomics, 26, 415-28.
[22] Willner, J. (1999) Policy Objectives and Performance in a Mixed Mar-
ket with Bargaining, International Journal of Industrial Organization,
17(1), 137-45.
19
7 Appendix
Table1: Mixed Duopoly Equilibrium Solutions
qm0 =
3[17+5(2 )](a c)
162+[56 (101 72)] q
m
1 =
11(3 )(1+)(a c)
162+[56 (101 72)]
xm0 =
[24+7(5+(1 ))](a c)
162+[56 (101 72)] x
m
1 =
[21+(38+7(1 ))](a c)
162+[56 (101 72)]
m0 =
[2169+(3126+907+1102 1743 2664+775)](a c)2
[162+(56 (101 72))]2
m1 =
[1863+(2880+966+1142 1693 2664+775)](a c)2
[162+(56 (101 72))]2
CSm = 2[42+13(2 )]
2(a c)2
[162+(56 (101 72))]2
SWm = [45+14(2 )](a c)
2
162+[56 (101 72)]
Table 2: Private DuopolyEquilibrium Solutions
qpi =
5(a c)
22 3(2+) ; i 2 f0; 1g
xpi =
3(1+)(a c)
22 3(2+) ; i 2 f0; 1g
pi =
[43+(6+13)](a c)2
[22 3(2+)]2 ; i 2 f0; 1g
CSp = 50(a c)
2
[22 3(2+)]2
SW p = 6(a c)
2
22 3(2+)
Proof of Proposition 3:
Total R&D, quantities and prots are given below.
Mixed duopoly:
xm0 + x
m
1 =
[45+(73+14(1 )](a c)
B ;
qm0 + q
m
1 =
2[42+13(2 )](a c)
B ;
m0 + 
m
1 =
[4032+(6006+1873+2242 3433 5324+1545)](a c)2
B2
:
Private duopoly (symmetric rms):
2xpi =
6(1+)(a c)
E ; 2q
p
i =
10(a c)
E ; 2
p
i =
2[43+(6+13)](a c)2
E2
;
where B = 162 + [56  (101  72)] > 0; E = 22  3(2 + ) > 0;8
,  2 [0; 1]:
We calculate:
In (i), xm0 + x
m
1   2xpi = (a c)EB : Since B > 0; E > 0 8 and  =
18 + 28 + 52   53 > 0 8, it follows that xm0 + xm1 > 2xpi 8: Next,
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qm0 + q
m
1   2qpi = 2(a c)EB ; the result then follows from the fact that  =
114 + 40   632 + 44 > 0 8; i.e. qm0 + qm1 > 2qpi :
In (ii), m0 +
m
1  2pi = (a c)
2
(EB)2
. The expression will be positive whenever
 > 0, where  =  305496   32856 + 5783722 + 386643   3197544 +
101025 + 608356   33327   44738 + 1689 + 11210. For  = 0,  =
 305496 < 0, while for  = 1,  = 22342 > 0. Further d=d 7 0 whenever
 7 0:028. Hence, by the mean-value theorem, the function  is strictly
increasing on (0:028; 1). This implies that there exists a critical value of the
spillover parameter , , dened as  = f j  = 0g with  2 (0:028; 1).
Straightforward calculation yields
 
 = 0:94. Thus, if  < 0:94, 2pi >
m0 + 
m
1 and if   0:94, the reverse holds. QED
Proof of Remarks following Proposition 3 :
(a) xm0   xp0 = (42 28+7
2+23)(a c)
EB > 0 8;
(b) xm1   xp1 = ( 24+56 2
2 73)(a c)
EB < 0 if and only if  < 0:44;
(c) qm0   qp0 = 2(156+37 79
2+54)(a c)
EB > 0 8;
(d) qm1   qp1 = 2( 42+3+16
2 4)(a c)
EB < 0 8;
(e) m0   p0 = F (a c)
2
E2B2
< 0 if and only if  < 0:65, since F =  78696 +
2712 + 2277482 + 198523   1519224 + 59485 + 303206   17747  
22598 + 849 + 5610 < 0 if and only if  < 0:65;
(f) m1  p1 = L(a c)
2
E2B2
< 0 8, since L =  226800 35568+3506242+
188123 1678324+41545+305156 15587 22148+849+5610 < 0
8. QED
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